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Abstract. This paper introduces Simpira, a family of cryptographic
permutations that supports inputs of 128 × b bits, where b is a positive
integer. Its design goal is to achieve high throughput on virtually all mod-
ern 64-bit processors, that nowadays already have native instructions for
AES. To achieve this goal, Simpira uses only one building block: the AES
round function. For b = 1, Simpira corresponds to 12-round AES with
fixed round keys, whereas for b ≥ 2, Simpira is a Generalized Feistel
Structure (GFS) with an F -function that consists of two rounds of AES.
We claim that there are no structural distinguishers for Simpira with a
complexity below 2128, and analyze its security against a variety of at-
tacks in this setting. The throughput of Simpira is close to the theoretical
optimum, namely, the number of AES rounds in the construction. For
example, on the Intel Skylake processor, Simpira has throughput below
1 cycle per byte for b ≤ 4 and b = 6. For larger permutations, where
moving data in memory has a more pronounced effect, Simpira with
b = 32 (512 byte inputs) evaluates 732 AES rounds, and performs at 824
cycles (1.61 cycles per byte), which is less than 13% off the theoretical
optimum. If the data is stored in interleaved buffers, this overhead is
reduced to less than 1%. The Simpira family offers an efficient solution
when processing wide blocks, larger than 128 bits, is desired.
Keywords. Cryptographic permutation, AES-NI, Generalized Feistel
Structure (GFS), Beyond Birthday-Bound (BBB) security, hash func-
tion, Lamport signature, wide-block encryption, Even-Mansour.
1 Introduction
The introduction of AES instructions by Intel (subsequently by AMD, and re-
cently ARM) has changed the playing field for symmetric-key cryptography on
⋆ c� IACR 2016. This article is the full version of the paper published by Springer-
Verlag, available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53887-6 4. It has ap-
peared in the proceedings of ASIACRYPT 2016.
modern processors, which lead to a significant reduction of the encryption over-
heads. The performance of these instructions has been steadily improving in
every new generation of processors. By now, on the latest Intel Architecture
Codename Skylake, the AESENC instruction that computes one round of AES
has latency of 4 cycles and throughput of 1 cycle. The improved AES perfor-
mance trend can be expected to continue, with the increasing demand for fast
encryption of more and more data.
To understand the impact of the AES instructions in practice, consider for
example the way that Google Chrome browser connects to https://google.
com. In this situation, Google is in a privileged position, as it controls both
the client and the server side. To speed up connections, Chrome (the client)
is configured to identify the processor’s capabilities. If AES-NI are available, it
would offer (to the server) to use AES-128-GCM for performing authenticated
encryption during the TLS handshake. The high-end server would accept the
proposed cipher suite, due to the high performance of AES-GCM on its side.
This would capture any recent 64-bit PC, tablet, desktop, or even smartphone.
On older processors, or architectures without AES instructions, Chrome resorts
to proposing the ChaCha20-Poly1305 algorithm during the secure handshake
negotiation.
An advantage of AES-GCM is that the message blocks can be processed
independently for encryption. This allows pipelining of the AES round instruc-
tions, so that the observed performance is dominated by their throughput, and
not by their latency [43, 44]. We note that even if a browser negotiates to use
an inherently sequential mode such as CBC encryption, the web server can pro-
cess multiple independent data buffers in parallel to achieve high throughput
(see [43, 44]), and this technique is already used in the recent OpenSSL version
1.0.2. This performance gain by collecting multiple independent encryption tasks
and pipelining their execution, is important for the design rationale of Simpira.
Setting. This paper should be understood in the following setting. We focus
only on processors with AES instructions. Assuming that several independent
data sources are available, we explore several symmetric-key cryptographic con-
structions with the goal of achieving a high throughput. Our reported bench-
marks are performed on the latest Intel processor, namely Architecture Code-
name Skylake, but we expect to achieve similar performance on any processor
that has AES instructions with throughput 1.
In particular, we focus here on applications where the 128-bit block size of
AES is not sufficient, and support for a wider range of block sizes is desired. This
includes various use cases such as permutation-based hashing and wide-block
encryption, or just to easily achieve security beyond 264 input blocks without
resorting to (often inefficient) modes of operation with “beyond birthday-bound”
security. For several concrete suggestions of applications, we refer to Sect. 7.
Admittedly, our decision to focus on only throughput may result in unopti-
mized performance in certain scenarios where the latency is critical. However,
we point out that this is not only a property of Simpira, but also of AES it-
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self, when it is implemented on common architectures with AES instructions.
To achieve optimal performance on such architectures, AES needs to be used
in a parallelizable mode of operation, or in a protocol that supports processing
independent inputs. Similarly, this is the case for Simpira as well. In fact, for
128-bit inputs, Simpira is the same as 12-round AES with fixed round keys.
Origin of the name. Simpira is named after a mythical animal of the Peruvian
Amazon. According to the legend, one of its front legs has the form of a spiral
that can be extended to cover the entire surface of the earth [26]. In a similar
spirit, the Simpira family of permutations extends itself to a very wide range
of input sizes. Alternatively, Simpira can be seen as an acronym for “SIMple
Permutations based on the Instruction for a Round of AES.”
Update. This paper proposes Simpira v2. Compared to Simpira v1, the Type-
1.x GFS by Yanagihara and Iwata was found to have a problem (see Sect. 8), and
is replaced by a new construction that performs the same number of AESENCs.
We also updated the round constants (see Sect. 4). Although no attack is cur-
rently known on Simpira v2 with the old rotation constants, the new constants
seem to strengthen Simpira without affecting its performance in our benchmarks.
Unless otherwise specified, Simpira in this document is assumed to refer to Sim-
pira v2.
2 Related Work
Block ciphers that support wide input blocks have been around for a long time.
Some of the earliest designs are Bear and Lion [2], and Beast [61]. They are
higher-level constructions, in the sense that they use hash functions and stream
ciphers as underlying components.
Perhaps the first wide-block block cipher that is not a higher-level construc-
tion is the Hasty Pudding Cipher [74], which supports block sizes of any positive
number of bits. Another early design is the Mercy block cipher that operates on
4096-bit blocks [27]. More recently, low-level constructions that can be scaled up
to large input sizes are the spongent [17,18] permutations and the LowMC [1]
block ciphers.
Our decision to use only the AES round function as a building block for
Simpira means that some alternative constructions are not considered in this
paper. Of particular interest are the EGFNs [7] used in Lilliput [6], the AESQ
permutation of PAEQ [13], and Haraka6 [55]. The security claims and benchmark
targets of these designs are very different from those of Simpira. We only claim
security up to 2128 blocks of input. However unlike Haraka, we consider all
distinguishing attacks up to this bound. Also, we focus only on throughput, and
6 The first version of Haraka was vulnerable to an attack by Jérémy Jean [51] due to
a bad choice of round constants. We therefore refer to the second version of Haraka,
which prevents the attack.
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not on latency. An interesting topic for future work is to design variants of these
constructions with similar security claims, and to compare their security and
implementation properties with Simpira.
3 Design Rationale of Simpira
AES [31] is a block cipher that operates on 128-bit blocks. It iterates the AES
round function 10, 12 or 14 times, using round keys that are derived from a
key of 128, 192 or 256 bits, respectively. On Intel (and AMD) processors, the
AES round function is implemented by the AESENC instruction. It takes a 128-bit
state and a 128-bit round key as inputs, and returns a 128-bit output that is
the result of applying the SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns and AddRoundKey
operations. An algorithmic description of AESENC is given in Alg. 1 of Sect. 4,
where we give the full specification of Simpira.
A cryptographic permutation can be obtained by setting the AES round keys
to fixed, publicly-known values. It is a bad idea to set all round keys to zero.
Such a permutation can easily be distinguished from random: if all input bytes
are equal to each other, the AES rounds preserve this property. Such problems
are avoided when round constants are introduced: this breaks the symmetry
inside every round, as well as the symmetry between rounds. Several ciphers
are vulnerable to attacks resulting from this property, such as the CAESAR
candidate PAES [52,53] and the first version of Haraka [51]. The aforementioned
design criterion, already present in Simpira v1, excludes the round constants of
these designs.
We decided to use two rounds of AES in Simpira as the basic building block.
As the AESENC instruction includes an XOR with a round key, this can be used
to introduce a round constant in one AES round, and to do a “free XOR” in the
other AES round. An added advantage is that two rounds of AES achieve full
bit diffusion: every output bit depends on every input bit, and every input bit
depends on every output bit.
Another design choice that we made, is to use only AES round functions in
our construction, and no other operations. Our hope is that this design would
maximize the contribution of every instruction to the security of the crypto-
graphic permutation. It also simplifies the analysis and the implementation.
From the performance viewpoint, the theoretically optimal software implemen-
tation would be able to dispatch a new AESENC instruction in every CPU clock
cycle. A straightforward way to realize this design strategy is to use a (Gener-
alized) Feistel Structure (GFS) for b ≥ 2 that operates on b input subblocks of
128 bits each, as shown in Fig. 1.
As with any design, our goal is to obtain a good trade-off between security
and efficiency. In order to explore a large design space, we use simple metrics to
quickly estimate whether a given design reaches a sufficient level of security, and
to determine its efficiency. In subsequent sections, we will formally introduce the
designs, and study them in detail to verify the accuracy of our estimates.
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Fig. 1. Two common classes of Generalized Feistel Structures (GFSs) are the Type-1
GFS (left) and the Type-2 GFS (right). For each example, two rounds are shown of a
GFS that operates on b = 6 subblocks. We will initially consider these GFSs in this
paper, as well as other GFSs with a different number of F -functions per round, and
other subblock shuffles at the end of every round. At a later stage, we will consider
more advanced constructions as well.
3.1 Design Criteria
Our design criteria are as follows. The significance of both criteria against crypt-
analysis attacks will be explained in Sect. 6.
– Security: We calculate the number of Feistel rounds to achieve either full
bit diffusion, as well as the number of Feistel rounds to achieve at least
25 (linearly or differentially) active S-boxes. To ensure a sufficient security
margin against known attacks, we require that the number of rounds is three
times the largest of these two numbers.
– Efficiency: As explained in Sect. 1, we will only focus on throughput. Given
that we use no other operations besides the AES round function, we will use
the number of AES round functions as an estimate for the total number of
cycles.
Suzaki and Minematsu [75] formally defined DRmax to calculate how many
Feistel rounds are needed for an input subblock to affect all the output sub-
blocks. We will say that full subblock diffusion is achieved after DRmax rounds
of the permutation or its inverse, whichever is greater. To achieve the strictly
stronger criterion of full bit diffusion, one or two additional Feistel rounds may
be required.
To obtain a lower bound for the minimum number of active S-boxes, we use
a simplified representation that assigns one bit to every pair of bytes, to indicate
whether or not they contain a non-zero difference (or linear mask). This allows
us to use the Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP) technique introduced
by Mouha et al. [69] to quickly find a lower bound for the minimum number of
active S-boxes.
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3.2 Design Space Exploration
For each input size of the permutation, we explore a range of designs, and choose
the one that maximizes the design criteria. If the search returns several alterna-
tives, it does not really matter which one we choose. In that case, we arbitrarily
choose the “simplest” design. The resulting Simpira design is shown in Fig. 2–3.
We will restrict ourselves to “simple” designs, such as for example construc-
tions with identical round functions, instead of exhaustively searching for the op-
timal design that satisfies the design criteria. This is meant to simplify the crypt-
analysis, as well as the implementation. We revisit this assumption in App. C.
Case b = 1. Full bit diffusion is reached after two rounds of AES, and four
rounds of AES ensures at least 25 active S-boxes [31]. Following the design
criteria, we select a design with 12 AES rounds.
Case b = 2. This is a (standard) Feistel structure. Full subblock diffusion is
achieved after two Feistel rounds, and three Feistel rounds are needed to reach
full bit diffusion. We find that five rounds ensures that there are at least 25 active
S-boxes (see Fig. 5). Consequently, we select a design with 15 Feistel rounds.
Case b = 3. There are several designs that are optimal according to our
criteria. They have either one or two F -functions per Feistel round, and various
possibilities exist to reorder the subblocks at the end of every Feistel round. We
choose what is arguably the simplest design: a Type-1 GFS according to Zheng
et al.’s classification [82]. Full subblock diffusion requires five Feistel rounds, and
at least six Feistel rounds are needed to ensure that there are least 25 active S-
boxes. As seven Feistel rounds are needed to achieve full bit diffusion, we select
a design with 21 Feistel rounds.
Case b ≥ 4. The Type-1 GFS does not scale well for larger b, as diffusion be-
comes the limiting factor. More formally, Yanagihara and Iwata [78, 79] proved
that the number of rounds required to reach full subblock diffusion is (at best)
quadratic in the number of subblocks, regardless of how the subblocks are re-
ordered at the end of every Feistel round.
In Simpira v1, the Yanagihara and Iwata’s Type-1.x (b,2) GFS [80] was
used for b ≥ 4, except for b = 6 and b = 8. This is a design with two F -
functions per round, where the number of rounds for full subblock diffusion is
linear in b. Unfortunately, as we will explain in Sect. 8, this GFS is problematic
as the same input subblock can be processed by more than one F -function. This
general observation enabled attacks on Simpira v1 by Dobraunig et al. [35] and
by Rønjom [73].
The Simpira v2 in this paper addresses this problem by ensuring that every
subblock will enter an F -function only once. We do this by means of a new GFS
construction. It uses 4b − 6 F -functions to reach full bit diffusion, and ensures
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b = 1 b = 2 b = 3
b = 4
x0 x0 x1 x0 x1 x2
x0 x1 x2 x3
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x0 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
b = 6
F F F F
b = 8
x0 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7
Fig. 2. One round of the Simpira construction for b ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8}. The total number
of rounds is 6 for b = 1, 15 for b = 2, b = 4 and b = 6, 21 for b = 3, and 18 for b = 8. F is
shorthand for Fc,b, where c is a counter that is initialized by one, and incremented after
every evaluation of Fc,b. Every Fc,b consists of two AES round evaluations, where the
round constants that are derived from (c, b). The last round is special: the MixColumns
is omitted when b = 1, and the final subblocks may be output in a different order. See
Sect. 4 for a full specification.
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Fig. 3. The Simpira construction for b /∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8}. F is shorthand for Fc,b, which
consists of two rounds of AES as specified in Alg. 2. A generic construction is shown for
all b ≥ 4, however for b ∈ {4, 6, 8} we will use the construction of Fig. 2. By convention,
the leftmost F -function is from left to right; when this is not the case in the diagram,
the direction of every F -function should be inverted. The full-round Simpira iterates
the construction in this diagram three times. See Sect. 4 for a full specification.
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that at least 30 S-boxes are active (see also App. A). This construction is iterated
three times, resulting in a design with 12b− 18 F -functions, which is the same
number of F -function as in Simpira v1.
We could also have used this construction for b = 4. However, we instead
chose to go for a Type-2 GFS with 15 rounds. This not only results in a simpler
construction, but also has the advantage ensuring at least 40 active S-boxes
(instead of only 30) after five rounds.
But even if we had considered Yanagihara and Iwata’s Type-1.x (b,2) GFS,
we should also consider GFSs with more than two F -functions per Feistel round,
which reach full subblock diffusion even quicker. However, this seems to come at
the cost of using more F -functions in total. Looking only at the tabulated values
of DRmax(π) and DRmax(π−1) in literature [75, 78–80], we can immediately
rule out almost all alternative designs. Nevertheless, two improved Type-2 GFS
designs by Suzaki and Minematsu [75] turned out to be superior. Instead of a
cyclic left shift, they reorder the subblocks in a different way at the end of every
Feistel round. We now explore these in detail.
Case b = 6. Let the subblock shuffle at the end of every Feistel round be pre-
sented by a list of indices that indicates which input subblock is mapped to which
output subblock, e.g. {b− 1, 0, 1, 2, . . . , b − 2} denotes a cyclic left shift. Suzaki
and Minematsu’s improved Type-2 GFS with subblock shuffle {3, 0, 1, 4, 5, 2}
reaches full subblock diffusion and full bit diffusion after five Feistel rounds. At
least 25 active S-boxes (in fact at least 30) are reached after four Feistel rounds.
Following the design criteria, we end up with a design with 15 Feistel rounds. As
this design has three F -functions in every Feistel round, it evaluates 3 · 15 = 45
F -functions. This is less than the general b ≥ 4 case that requires 6b− 9 Feistel
rounds with 2 F -functions per round, which corresponds to (6 · 6 − 9) · 2 = 54
F -functions.
Case b = 8. Suzaki and Minematsu’s improved Type-2 GFS with subblock
shuffle {3, 0, 7, 4, 5, 6, 1, 2} ensures both full subblock diffusion and full bit dif-
fusion after six rounds. After four Feistel rounds, there are at least 25 active
S-boxes (in fact at least 30). According to the design criteria, we end up with
a design with 18 Feistel rounds, or 18 · 4 = 72 F -functions in total. The gen-
eral b ≥ 4 design would have required (6b − 9) · 2 F -functions, which for b = 8
corresponds to (6 · 8− 9) · 2 = 78 F -functions.
3.3 Design Alternatives
Until now, the only designs we discussed were GFS constructions where the F -
function consists of two rounds of AES. We now take a step back, and briefly
discuss alternative design choices.
As explained earlier, it is convenient to use two rounds of AES as a building
block. It not only means that we reach full bit diffusion, but also that a “free
XOR” is available to add a round constant on Intel and AMD architectures.
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It is nevertheless possible to consider GFS designs with an F -function that
consists of only one AES round. A consequence of this design choice is that
extra XOR instructions will be needed to introduce round constants, which could
increase the cycle count. But this design choice also complicates the analysis. For
example when b = 2, we find that 25 Feistel rounds are then needed to ensure
at least 25 linearly active S-boxes. As shown in Fig. 4, this is because the tool
can only ensure one active S-box for every Feistel round. Using two rounds of
AES avoids this problem (see Fig. 5), and also significantly speeds up the tool:
it makes bounding the minimum number of active S-boxes rather easy, instead
of becoming increasingly complicated for a reasonably large value of b.
AC SB SR MC
Fig. 4. A linear characteristic for an AES-based Feistel that uses only one round of
AES inside its F -function. Crosshatches represent bytes with non-zero linear masks.
The AES round consists of the AddConstant (AC), SubBytes (AC), ShiftRows (SR),
and MixColumns (MC) operations. This round has only one active S-box. Therefore, 25
rounds are needed to ensure that there are least 25 linearly active S-boxes.
Likewise, we could also consider designs with more than two AES rounds per
F -function. In our experiments, we have not found any cases where this results
in a design where the total number of AES rounds is smaller. The intuition
is as follows: the number of Feistel rounds to reach full subblock diffusion is
independent of the F -function, therefore adding more AES rounds to every F
function is not expected to result in a better trade-off.
If we take another step back, we might consider to use other instructions
besides AESENC. Clearly, AESDEC can be used as an alternative, and the security
properties and the benchmarks will remain the same. In fact, we use AESDECwhen
b = 1, to implement the inverse permutation. We do not use the AESENCLAST and
AESDECLAST instructions, as they omit the MixColumns (resp. InvMixColumns)
operation that is crucial to the wide trail design strategy [30] of AES. We do,
10
SB
SR MC
AC
SB
SR MC
Fig. 5. A linear characteristic for one round of Simpira with b = 2 with 5 active S-
boxes. Crosshatches represent bytes with non-zero linear masks. As Simpira uses two
AES rounds per F -function, it can reach 25 active S-boxes in only 5 Feistel rounds,
corresponding to 10 AES rounds in total.
however, use only one AESENCLAST for the very last round of the b = 1 per-
mutation, as this makes an efficient implementation of the inverse permutation
possible on Intel architectures. This is equivalent to applying a linear transfor-
mation to the output of the b = 1 permutation, therefore it does not reduce its
cryptographic properties.
Of course, it is possible to use non-AES instructions, possibly in combination
with AES instructions. Actually, we do not need to be restricted to (generalized)
Feistel designs for b ≥ 2. However, such considerations are outside of the scope
of this paper.
4 Specification of Simpira
An algorithmic specification of the Simpira design of Fig. 2–3 is given in Fig. 9–
11. It uses one round of AES as a building block, which corresponds to the
AESENC instruction on Intel processors (see Alg. 1). Its input is a 128-bit xmm
register, which stores the AES 4 × 4 matrix of bytes as shown in Fig. 6. For
additional details, we refer to [44].
The F -function is specified in Alg. 2. It is parameterized by a counter c and
by the number of subblocks b. Here, SETR EPI32 converts four 32-bit values into
a 128-bit value, using the same byte ordering as the mm setr epi32() compiler
intrinsic. Fig. 7 shows how the constants can be expressed using the 4 × 4 byte
matrix of AES.
Note that the constants have been updated in Simpira v2. The old constants
of Simpira v1 are shown in Fig. 8. This update can be seen as “Grøstl strength-
11
s0 s4 s8 s12
s1 s5 s9 s13
s2 s6 s10 s14
s3 s7 s11 s15
Fig. 6. The internal state of AES can be represented by a 4× 4 matrix of bytes, or as
a 128-bit xmm register value s = s15� . . . �s0, where s0 is the least significant byte.
0x00⊕ c0 ⊕ b0 0x10⊕ c0 ⊕ b0 0x20⊕ c0 ⊕ b0 0x30⊕ c0 ⊕ b0
c1 ⊕ b1 c1 ⊕ b1 c1 ⊕ b1 c1 ⊕ b1
c2 ⊕ b2 c2 ⊕ b2 c2 ⊕ b2 c2 ⊕ b2
c3 ⊕ b3 c3 ⊕ b3 c3 ⊕ b3 c3 ⊕ b3
Fig. 7. The constants used inside the Fc,b function of Alg. 2, expressed as a 4 × 4
matrix of bytes. Here, c = c4� . . . �c0 and b = b4� . . . �b0 are 32-bit integers, where the
least significant byte is c0 and b0 respectively.
ening,” as it is inspired by the new round constants of the final-round Grøstl
SHA-3 candidate [41]. No attack is currently known on Simpira v2 with the
old rotation constants. Nevertheless, this change seems to strengthen Simpira
without affecting its performance in our benchmarks.
c0 b0 0 0
c1 b1 0 0
c2 b2 0 0
c3 b3 0 0
Fig. 8. The old Simpira v1 constants used inside the Fc,b function of Alg. 2, expressed
as a 4× 4 matrix of bytes. Again, c = c4� . . . �c0 and b = b4� . . . �b0 are 32-bit integers,
where the least significant byte is x0 and c0 respectively.
Both the input and output of Simpira consist of b subblocks of 128 bits. The
arrays use zero-based numbering, and array subscripts should be taken modulo
the number of elements of the array. The subblock shuffle is done implicitly:
we do not reorder the subblocks at the end of a Feistel round, but instead we
apply the F -functions to other subblock inputs in the subsequent round. It is
rather straightforward to implement the cyclic left shift in this way. For b = 6
and b = 8, the implementation of the subblock shuffle uses a decomposition into
disjoint cycles.
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As a result of this implementation choice, for b ∈ {2, 3, 4, 6, 8}, Simpira and
its reduced-round variants are not always equivalent to a (generalized) Feistel
with identical rounds. For example, for b = 2 the F -function is alternatingly
applied from left to right and from right to left. When the number of rounds
is odd, this is not equivalent to a Feistel with identical rounds: the two output
subblocks will be swapped.
When b = 1, an extra InvMixColumns operation is applied to the output.
This is equivalent to omitting the MixColumns operation in the last round, and
is required to efficiently implement the inverse Simpira permutation using Intel’s
AES instructions. For details on how to efficiently implement both Simpira and
Simpira−1 when b = 1, see App. B.
The design strategy of Simpira is intended to be very conservative. Because
we think that the security of Simpira with very large b may not yet be well
understood, we recommend to use Simpira with b ≤ 65536, corresponding to
inputs of at most one megabyte. However, the external cryptanalysis of Simpira
for any value of b is highly encouraged.
5 Benchmarks
We measured the performance of Simpira on the latest Intel processor, Architec-
ture Codename Skylake. On this platform, the latency of AESENC is 4 cycles, and
its throughput is 1 cycle. It follows that the software can be written in a way that
fills the pipeline, by operating on four independent inputs. To obtain maximum
throughput for all permutation sizes, we wrote functions that compute Simpira
on four independent inputs. All Simpira permutations are benchmarked in the
same setting, to make the results comparable.
Note that when b = 4, Simpira uses two independent F -functions, which
means that maximum throughput could already be reached with only two in-
dependent inputs. For b = 8, where Simpira has four independent F -functions,
even a single-stream Simpira implementation would fill the pipeline.
The measurements are performed as follows. We benchmark a function that
evaluates Simpira for four independent inputs, and computed the number of
cycles to carry out 256 calls to this function, as a “unit.” This provides us
with the throughput of Simpira. The results were obtained by using the RDTSCP
instruction, 250 repetitions as a “warmup” phase, averaging the measurement
on subsequent 1000 runs. Finally, this experiment was repeated 30 times, and
the best result was selected. The platform was set up with Hyperthreading and
Turbo Boost disabled.
The four data inputs can be stored sequentially at different pointers, or in
an interleaved way (i.e. A[0]B[0]C[0]D[0]A[1]B[1]C[1]D[1]...). We bench-
marked both settings. The results are shown in Table 1. We present only bench-
marks for the forward Simpira permutation; the benchmarks for Simpira−1
turned out to be very similar.
We refer to App. D for a comparison with other constructions.
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Algorithm 1 AESENC (see [44])
1: procedure AESENC(state, key)
2: state ← SubBytes(state)
3: state ← ShiftRows(state)
4: state ← MixColumns(state)
5: state ← state ⊕ key
6: return state
7: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Fc,b(x)
1: procedure Fc,b(x)
2: C ← SETR EPI32(0x00⊕ c⊕ b,
3: 0x10⊕ c⊕ b,
4: 0x20⊕ c⊕ b,
5: 0x30⊕ c⊕ b)
6: return AESENC(AESENC(x,C), 0)
7: end procedure
Algorithm 3 Simpira (b = 1)
1: procedure Simpira(x0)
2: R ← 6
3: for c = 1, . . . , R do
4: x0 ← Fc,b(x0)
5: end for
6: InvMixColumns(x0)
7: return x0
8: end procedure
Algorithm 4 Simpira−1 (b = 1)
1: procedure Simpira(x0)
2: R ← 6
3: MixColumns(x0)
4: for c = R, . . . , 1 do
5: x0 ← F
−1
c,b (x0)
6: end for
7: return x0
8: end procedure
Algorithm 5 Simpira (b ∈ {2, 3, 4})
1: procedure Simpira(x0, . . . , xb−1)
2: if (b = 2) ∨ (b = 3) then
3: R ← 6b+ 3
4: else
5: R ← 15
6: end if
7: c ← 1
8:
9: for r = 0, . . . , R − 1 do
10: xr+1 ← xr+1 ⊕ Fc,b(xr)
11: c ← c+ 1
12: if b = 4 then
13: xr+3 ← xr+3 ⊕ Fc,b(xr+2)
14: c ← c+ 1
15: end if
16: end for
17: return (x0, x1, . . . , xb−1)
18: end procedure
Algorithm 6 Simpira−1 (b ∈ {2, 3, 4})
1: procedure Simpira−1(x0, . . . , xb−1)
2: if (b = 2) ∨ (b = 3) then
3: R ← 6b + 3
4: c ← R
5: else
6: R ← 15
7: c ← 2R
8: end if
9: for r = R − 1, . . . , 0 do
10: if b = 4 then
11: xr+3 ← xr+3 ⊕ Fc,b(xr+2)
12: c ← c− 1
13: end if
14: xr+1 ← xr+1 ⊕ Fc,b(xr)
15: c ← c− 1
16: end for
17: return (x0, x1, . . . , xb−1)
18: end procedure
Fig. 9. Alg. 2 specifies Fc,b using the AESENC operation that is defined in Alg. 1. Alg. 3–
6 specify Simpira and its inverse for b ≤ 4, where the input and output consist of
b subblocks of 128 bits. Note that all arrays use zero-based numbering, and array
subscripts should be taken modulo the number of elements of the array.
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Algorithm 7 Simpira (b = 6)
1: procedure Simpira(x0, . . . , x5)
2: R ← 15
3: c ← 1
4: s ← (0, 1, 2, 5, 4, 3)
5: for r = 0, . . . , R − 1 do
6: xs
r+1
← xs
r+1
⊕ Fc,b(xsr )
7: c ← c+ 1
8: xs
r+5
← xs
r+5
⊕ Fc,b(xs
r+2
)
9: c ← c+ 1
10: xs
r+3
← xs
r+3
⊕ Fc,b(xs
r+4
)
11: c ← c+ 1
12: end for
13: return (x0, x1, . . . , x5)
14: end procedure
Algorithm 8 Simpira−1 (b = 6)
1: procedure Simpira−1(x0, . . . , x5)
2: R ← 15
3: c ← 45
4: s ← (0, 1, 2, 5, 4, 3)
5: for r = R − 1, . . . , 0 do
6: xs
r+3
← xs
r+3
⊕ Fc,b(xs
r+4
)
7: c ← c− 1
8: xs
r+5
← xs
r+5
⊕ Fc,b(xs
r+2
)
9: c ← c− 1
10: xs
r+1
← xs
r+1
⊕ Fc,b(xsr )
11: c ← c− 1
12: end for
13: return (x0, x1, . . . , x5)
14: end procedure
Algorithm 9 Simpira (b = 8)
1: procedure Simpira(x0, . . . , x7)
2: R ← 18
3: c ← 1
4: s ← (0, 1, 6, 5, 4, 3)
5: t ← (2, 7)
6: for r = 0, . . . , R − 1 do
7: xs
r+1
← xs
r+1
⊕ Fc,b(xsr )
8: c ← c+ 1
9: xs
r+5
← xs
r+5
⊕ Fc,b(xtr )
10: c ← c+ 1
11: xs
r+3
← xs
r+3
⊕ Fc,b(xs
r+4
)
12: c ← c+ 1
13: xt
r+1
← xt
r+1
⊕ Fc,b(xs
r+2
)
14: c ← c+ 1
15: end for
16: return (x0, x1, . . . , x7)
17: end procedure
Algorithm 10 Simpira−1 (b = 8)
1: procedure Simpira−1(x0, . . . , x7)
2: R ← 18
3: c ← 72
4: s ← (0, 1, 6, 5, 4, 3)
5: t ← (2, 7)
6: for r = R − 1, . . . , 0 do
7: xt
r+1
← xt
r+1
⊕ Fc,b(xs
r+2
)
8: c ← c− 1
9: xs
r+3
← xs
r+3
⊕ Fc,b(xs
r+4
)
10: c ← c− 1
11: xs
r+5
← xs
r+5
⊕ Fc,b(xtr )
12: c ← c− 1
13: xs
r+1
← xs
r+1
⊕ Fc,b(xsr )
14: c ← c− 1
15: end for
16: return (x0, x1, . . . , x7)
17: end procedure
Fig. 10. Alg. 7–10 specify Simpira and its inverse for b = 6 and b = 8, using the Fc,b-
function that is specified in Alg. 2. The input and the output consist of b subblocks of
128 bits. Note that all arrays use zero-based numbering, and array subscripts should
be taken modulo the number of elements of the array.
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Algorithm 11 Simpira
(b /∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8})
1: procedure Simpira(x0, . . . , xb−1)
2: k ← 0
3: d ← 2 · ⌊b/2⌋
4: for j = 1, . . . , 3 do
5: if d �= b then
6: TwoF(b − 2, k)
7: k ← k + 1
8: end if
9: for r = 0, . . . , d− 2 do
10: TwoF(r, k)
11: k ← k + 1
12: if r �= d− r − 2 then
13: TwoF(d − r − 2, k)
14: k ← k + 1
15: end if
16: end for
17: if d �= b then
18: TwoF(b − 2, k)
19: k ← k + 1
20: end if
21: end for
22: return (x0, x1, . . . , xb−1)
23: end procedure
24: procedure TwoF(r, k)
25: if r mod 2 = 0 then
26: xr+1 ← xr+1 ⊕ F2k+1,b(xr)
27: xr ← xr ⊕ F2k+2,b(xr+1)
28: else
29: xr ← xr ⊕ F2k+1,b(xr+1)
30: xr+1 ← xr+1 ⊕ F2k+2,b(xr)
31: end if
32: end procedure
Algorithm 12 Simpira−1
(b /∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8})
1: procedure Simpira−1(x0, . . . , xb−1)
2: k ← 6b− 10
3: d ← 2 · ⌊b/2⌋
4: for j = 1, . . . , 3 do
5: if d �= b then
6: InvTwoF(b − 2, k)
7: k ← k − 1
8: end if
9: for r = d− 2, . . . , 0 do
10: if r �= d− r − 2 then
11: InvTwoF(d − r − 2, k)
12: k ← k − 1
13: end if
14: InvTwoF(r, k)
15: k ← k − 1
16: end for
17: if d �= b then
18: InvTwoF(b − 2, k)
19: k ← k − 1
20: end if
21: end for
22: return (x0, x1, . . . , xb−1)
23: end procedure
24: procedure InvTwoF(r, k)
25: if r mod 2 = 0 then
26: xr ← xr ⊕ F2k+2,b(xr+1)
27: xr+1 ← xr+1 ⊕ F2k+1,b(xr)
28: else
29: xr+1 ← xr+1 ⊕ F2k+2,b(xr)
30: xr ← xr ⊕ F2k+1,b(xr+1)
31: end if
32: end procedure
Fig. 11. Alg. 11–12 specify Simpira and its inverse for b /∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8}, using the
Fc,b-function that is specified in Alg. 2. Both the input and the output consist of b
subblocks of 128 bits.
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Table 1. Benchmarking results for the throughput of the Simpira permutations. For
every b, we benchmark a function that applies the 128b-bit permutation to four in-
dependent inputs. The data is either stored sequentially at different pointers, or in
interleaved buffers. We give the number of cycles to process the four inputs, as well
as the overhead compared the theoretical optimum of performing only AESENC instruc-
tions.
non-interleaved interleaved
b bits # AESENC cycles (4×) overhead cycles (4×) overhead
1 128 12 50 3% 50 3%
2 256 30 122 1% 122 1%
3 384 42 171 2% 171 2%
4 512 60 241 1% 241 1%
6 768 90 362 1% 362 1%
8 1024 144 594 3% 594 3%
16 2048 348 1586 14% 1400 1%
32 4096 732 3295 13% 2946 1%
64 8192 1500 6791 13% 6040 1%
128 16384 3036 13942 15% 12220 1%
256 32768 6108 31444 29% 24799 2%
6 Cryptanalysis
The design criteria of Sect. 3 are not meant to be sufficient to guarantee security.
In fact, it is not difficult to come up with trivially insecure constructions that
satisfy (most of) the criteria. Rather, the design criteria are meant to assist
us in identifying interesting constructions, which must then pass the scrutiny
of cryptanalysis. Actually, during the design process of Simpira, we stumbled
upon designs that were either insecure, or for which the security analysis was
not so straightforward. When this happened, we adjusted the design criteria and
repeated the search for constructions.
As such, we will not directly use the design criteria to argue the security
of Simpira. Instead, we will use the fact that Simpira uses (generalized) Feistel
structures and the AES round function, both of which have been extensively
studied in literature. This allows us to focus our cryptanalysis efforts on the
most promising attacks for this type of construction. We have tried to make
this section easy to understand, which will hopefully convince the reader that
Simpira should have a very comfortable security margin against all currently-
known attacks.
Security claim. In what follows, we will only consider structural distinguish-
ers [8] with a complexity up to 2128. Simpira can be used in constructions that
require a random permutation, however no statements can be made for adver-
saries that exceed 2128 queries. This type of security argument was first made
by the SHA-3 [38] design team in response to high-complexity distinguishing
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attacks on the underlying permutation [19–21], and has since been reused for
other permutation-based designs.
Symmetry attacks. As explained in Sect. 3, the round constants are meant to
avoid symmetry inside a Simpira round, as well as symmetry between rounds.
The round constants also depend on b, which means that Simpira permutations
of different widths should be indistinguishable from each other. The round con-
stants are generated by a simple counter: this not only makes the design easy to
understand and to implement, but also avoids any concerns that the constants
may contain a backdoor. Every F -function has a different round constant: this
does not seem to affect performance on recent Intel platforms, but greatly re-
duces the probability that a symmetry property can be maintained over several
rounds.
Invariant subspace attacks. In its basic form, an invariant subspace at-
tack [58] implies that there exists a coset of a vector space, so any number
of iterations of the cryptographic round function maps to cosets of the same
subspace. Rønjom [73] describes such an attack on Simpira v1 with b = 4, which
is fixed in the current version. As explained in Sect. 9, no invariant subspace
attacks were found for Simpira v2.
State collisions. For most block-cipher-based modes of operation, it is possible
to define a “state,” which is typically 128 bits long. This can be the chaining
value for CBC mode, the counter for CTR mode, or the checksum in OCB. When
a collision is found in this state, which is expected to happen around 264 queries,
the mode becomes insecure. For the Feistel-based Simpira (b ≥ 2), there is no
such concept of a “state.” In fact: all subblocks receive roughly an equal amount
of “processing.” This allows Simpira to reach security beyond 264 queries after
a sufficient amount of Feistel rounds.
Linear and differential cryptanalysis. Simpira’s security argument against
linear [12] and differential [62] cryptanalysis (up to attacks with complexity 2128)
is the same as the argument for AES, which is based on counting the number of
active S-boxes. As explained in [31], four rounds of AES have at least 25 (linearly
or differentially) active S-boxes. Then any four-round differential characteristic
holds with a probability less than 2−6·25 = 2−150, and any four-round linear
characteristic holds with a correlation less than 2−3·25 = 2−75.
Here, 2−6 refers to the maximum difference propagation probability, and 2−3
is the maximum correlation amplitude of the S-box used in AES. The afore-
mentioned reasoning makes the common assumptions that the probabilities of
every round of a characteristic can be multiplied, and that this leads to a good
estimate for the probability of the characteristic, and also of the corresponding
differential.
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The number of rounds typically needs to be slightly higher to account for
partial key guesses (for keyed constructions), and to have a reasonable security
margin. For any of the Simpira designs, we have at least three times the number
of rounds required to reach 25 active S-boxes. This should give a sizable secu-
rity margin against linear and differential cryptanalysis, and even against more
advanced variants such as saturation and integral cryptanalysis [29]. In the case
of integral cryptanalysis, of particular interest are the recently proposed integral
distinguishers on Feistel and Generalized Feistel Networks by Todo [76] and by
Zhang and Wenling [81].
Boomerang and differential-linear cryptanalysis. Instead of using one
long characteristic, boomerang [77] and differential-linear [11, 57] cryptanalysis
combine two shorter characteristics. But even combined with partial key guesses,
the fact that Simpira has at least three times the number of rounds that result
in 25 active S-boxes, should be more than sufficient to protect against this type
of attacks.
Truncated and impossible differential cryptanalysis. When full bit dif-
fusion is not reached, it is easy to construct a truncated differential [54] charac-
teristic with probability one. A common way to construct an impossible differ-
ential [9,10] is the miss in the middle approach. It combines two probability-one
truncated differentials, whose conditions cannot be met together.
However, every Simpira variant has at least three times the number of rounds
to reach full bit diffusion. This should not only prevent truncated and impossible
differential attacks, but result in a satisfactory security margin against such
attacks.
Meet-in-the-middle and rebound attacks. Meet-in-the-middle-attacks [34]
separate the equations that describe a symmetric-key primitive into two or three
groups. This is done in such a way that some variables do not appear into at
least one of these groups. A typical rebound attack [64] also splits a cipher into
three parts: an inner part that is satisfied by meet-in-the-middle techniques (in
the inbound phase), and two outer parts that are fulfilled in a probabilistic way
(in the outbound phase).
With Simpira, splitting the construction in three parts will always result
in one part that either has at least 25 active S-boxes, or that reaches full bit
diffusion. This should not only prevent meet-in-the-middle and rebound attacks,
but also provide a large security margin against these attacks.
On Simpira with b = 1 (corresponding to 12-round AES with fixed round
keys), the best known distinguisher is a rebound attack by Gilbert and Peyrin [42]
that attacks 8 rounds out of 12.
Generic attacks. A substantial amount of literature exists on generic attacks
of Feistel structures. In particular, we are interested in attacks in Maurer et
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al.’s indifferentiability setting [63], which is an extension of the indistinguisha-
bility notion for constructions that use publicly available oracles. In Simpira,
the F -functions contain no secret key, and are therefore assumed to be publicly
available.
Coron et al. [25] showed that five rounds of Feistel are not indifferentiable
from a random permutation, and presented a indifferentiability proof for six
rounds. Holenstein et al. [50] later showed that their proof is flawed, and provided
a new indifferentiability proof for fourteen rounds. In very recent work, Dai
and Steinberger [32] and independently Dachman-Soled et al. [28] announced
an indifferentiability proof for the 10-round Feistel, which Dai and Steinberger
subsequently improved to a proof for 8 rounds [33].
A problem with the aforementioned indifferentiability proofs is that they are
rather weak: if the F -function is 128 bits wide, security is only proven up to
about 216 queries. The indistinguishability setting is better understood, where
many proofs are available for not only Feistel, but also various generalized Feistel
structures. But even in this setting, most proofs do not go beyond 264 queries,
and proving security with close to 2128 queries requires a very large number of
rounds [49].
So although several of Simpira’s Feistel-based permutations were proven to
be indistinguishable from random permutations using [65,82], it is an open prob-
lem to prove stronger security bounds for Simpira and other generalized Feistel
structures. Nevertheless, no generic attacks are known for Simpira, even when
up to 2128 are made.
Note that strictly speaking, there is an exception to the previous sentence for
Simpira with b = 1. It is guaranteed to be an even permutation [22, Thm. 4.8],
and therefore 2128−1 queries can distinguish it from a random permutation with
advantage 0.5. We only mention this for completeness; actually all of Simpira’s
permutations can be shown to be even, but this is typically not considered to be
more than just a mathematical curiosity.
Other attacks. We do not consider brute-force-like attacks [70], such as the
biclique attacks on AES [16]: they perform exhaustive search on a smaller number
of rounds, and therefore do not threaten the practical security of the cipher.
However, it will be interesting to investigate such attacks in future work, as they
give an indication of the security of the cipher in the absence of other attacks. We
also do not look into algebraic attacks, as AES seems to very resistant against
such attacks.
7 Applications
Simpira can be used in various scenarios where AES does not permit an efficient
construction with security up to 2128 evaluations of the permutation. We present
a brief overview possible applications.
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A block cipher without round keys. The (single-key) Even-Mansour con-
struction [37, 39, 40] uses a secret key K to turn a plaintext P into a ciphertext
C as follows:
C = EK(P ) = π(P ⊕K)⊕K , (1)
where π is an n-bit permutation. As argued by Dunkelman et al. [37], the con-
struction is minimal, in the sense that simplifying it, for example by removing
one of its components, will render it completely insecure. Mouha and Luykx [67]
showed that the Even-Mansour is in some sense optimal in the multi-key setting,
where several keys are independently and uniformly drawn from the key space.
When D plaintext-ciphertexts are available, the secret key K of the Even-
Mansour construction can be recovered in 2n/D (off-line) evaluations of the per-
mutation π [37]. This may be acceptable in lightweight authentication algorithms
which rekey regularly, but may not be sufficient for encryption purposes [66,67].
In order to achieve security up to about 2128 queries against all attacks in the
multi-key setting, the Even-Mansour construction requires a permutation of at
least 256 bits.
An important advantage of the Even-Mansour construction is that it avoids
the need to precalculate round keys (and store them securely!) or to calculate
them on the fly. Moreover, it also allows the easy construction of a tweakable
block cipher. For a given tweak T , one can turn the Even-Mansour construction
into a tweakable block cipher [59, 60]:
C = EK(P ) = π(P ⊕K · T )⊕K · T , (2)
that can be proven to be secure up to 2n/2 queries in the multi-key setting using
the proof of [67,68]. For concreteness, we use the multiplication K ·T in GF (2n),
which restricts the tweaks to T �= 0. However, any ǫ-AXU hash function can be
used instead of this multiplication [23].
If the cipher is computed in a parallelizable mode of operation, independent
blocks can be pipelined, and the performance would be dominated by Simpira
with the relevant value of b, plus the overhead of the key addition.
Permutation-based hashing. Achieving 128-bit collision resistance with a
128-bit permutation has been shown to be impossible [71]. Typically, a large
permutation size is used to achieve a high throughput, for example 1600 bits in
the sponge construction of SHA-3 [38]. The downside of using a large permu-
tation is that performance is significantly reduced when many short messages
need to be hashed, for example to compute a Lamport signature [56]. Simpira
overcomes these problems by providing a family of efficient permutations with
different input sizes.
In particular for hashing short messages, one may consider to use Simpira
with a Davies-Meyer feed-forward: π(x) ⊕ x. This construction has been shown
to be optimally preimage and collision-resistant [14, 15], and even preimage
aware [36], but not indifferentiable from a random oracle [24] as it is easy to
find a fixed point: π−1(0). To match the intended application, padding of the
input and/or truncation of the output of Simpira may be required.
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Wide-block encryption and robust authenticated encryption. Wide-
block encryption can be used to provide security against chosen ciphertext at-
tacks when short (or even zero-length) authentication tags are used. In the con-
text of full-disk encryption, there is usually no space to store an authentication
tag. In an attempt to reduce the risk that ciphertext changes result in meaning-
ful plaintext, a possibility is to use a wide block cipher to encrypt an entire disk
sector, which typically has a size of 512 to 4096 bytes.
The same concern also exists when short authentication tags are used, and
can be addressed by an encode-then-encipher approach [5]: add some bits of
redundancy, and then encrypt with an arbitrary-input-length block cipher. Note
that this technique achieves robust authenticated encryption [48].
Typical solutions for wide-block encryption such as the VIL [4], CMC [46] and
EME [45,47] modes of operation have the disadvantage that they are patented,
and do not provide security beyond 264 blocks of input. We are unaware of any
patents related to Simpira.
When used in an Even-Mansour construction, Simpira with b ≥ 2 can provide
a wide block cipher that provides security up to 2128 blocks. When the block
size exceeds the key size, the Even-Mansour construction can be generalized as
follows:
C = EK(P ) = π(P ⊕ (K · T )�0
∗)⊕ (K · T )�0∗) , (3)
where we set T = 1 if no tweak is provided. Note that this straightforward
extension of the Even-Mansour construction appears in the proof for various
sponge constructions. The first proof of security of this construction in the multi-
key setting was given by Andreeva et al. [3].
8 A Problem with Yanagihara and Iwata’s GFS
For b ≥ 4 (except b = 6 and b = 8), Simpira v1 used Yanagihara and Iwata’s
Type-1.x (b,2) GFS [80]. This is a GFS with two F -functions per round, shown
in Fig. 12. Strictly speaking, we consider a variant of Yanagihara and Iwata’s
construction, that is identical up to a reordering of the input and output sub-
blocks.
This construction has a problem. As can be seen from Fig. 12, the same
value x0 will eventually be processed by two F -functions. This clearly results in
a redundant calculation, as the same F -function is evaluated twice on the same
input.
In Simpira v1, the F -functions are not entirely identical due to the round
constants. However, it can be seen that the problem in Yanagihara and Iwata’s
Type-1.x GFS also results in an attack on Simpira v1. In particular, the bounds
on the number of active S-boxes were not correct, as the exact same S-box
transitions were counted more than once. Dobraunig et al. [35] exploited the
fact that the actual number of active S-boxes is much lower than expected, and
constructed a series of attacks on the full 15-round Simpira v1 with b = 4,
including a collision attack with complexity 282.62 on Simpira when it is used in
a truncated Davies-Meyer hash construction.
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F F · · ·
· · ·
x0 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 xb−2 xb−1
Fig. 12. Yanagihara and Iwata’s Type-1.x (b,2) GFS [80], which was used in Sim-
pira v1. Note that regardless of b, the same x0 will eventually enter an F -function
twice after a sufficient number of rounds.
The problem with Yanagihara and Iwata’s construction was confirmed to
us by its designers. It was pointed out to us that their Type-1.x GFS was im-
plicitly assumed to use independent round keys, but that this assumption was
unfortunately not mentioned in their paper [80].
When this assumption does not hold, the counts of active S-boxes can be
incorrect. This occurs when various simple key schedules are used, such as for
example the Even-Mansour construction. We avoid this problem in Simpira v2
by ensuring that the same input is never processed by more than one F -function.
This can be seen to avoid attacks on GFS in block-cipher-based constructions,
when used with a uniformly random key.
But Simpira is designed to be a family of cryptographic permutations, and
should therefore also be secure in unkeyed settings. In the next section, we show
how the unkeyed setting leads to invariant subspace attacks on Simpira v1 for
b = 4.
9 Invariant Subspace Attacks
Leander et al. [58] introduced the term invariant subspace attack, which applies
when there exists a (large) subspace, so that any coset of this subspace is mapped
to itself when the round function is applied. We now explain such an attack
applies to Yanagihara and Iwata Type-1.x (4,2) GFS. Again, strictly speaking
Yanagihara and Iwata defined a variant of this construction, that is, however,
identical up to a reordering of the input and output blocks. As illustrated in
Fig. 13, we find that if the second and the last subblock of the input are identical,
this property is preserved after any multiple of two rounds.
A similar observation also holds for Simpira v1 with b = 4, where only the
round constants slightly destroy the symmetry property of the input. This is
a consequence of the sparse round constants in Simpira v1, and the reuse of
values into several F -functions, as explained in Sect. 8. In particular, for any
even multiple of rounds up to 126, Simpira v1 round constants (see Fig. 8) only
differ in the zeroth byte of the AES state. This means that if the second and the
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F F
A X B X
F F
C Y A Y
Fig. 13. Yanagihara and Iwata Type-1.x (4,2) GFS [80], which was used in Simpira v1
for b = 4. We assume that all F -functions are identical. Here A, B and X can be any
value. The leftmost input subblock enters the same F -function twice, and therefore
guarantees that the output value Y will appear twice as well.
last subblock of the input are identical, this property will be preserved, except
for the first column of corresponding AES states.
Rønjom [73] described an invariant subspace attack on Simpira v1 with b = 4.
In particular, Rønjom identified a large subspace such that any coset of this space
is invariant under two rounds of Simpira v2. This leads to a plaintext invariant
over infinitely many even rounds. It can be seen as a generalization of the attack
on Yanagihara-Iwata’s Type-1.x GFS that is described in this section.
The property does not hold for an odd number of rounds, so it does not
apply directly for Simpira v1 with b = 4, which consists of 15 Feistel rounds. For
this reason, we did not detect any non-randomness in our test vectors, although
it included the all-zero input that is an element of the coset of the invariant
subspace. However, simply applying the permutation twice means that the total
number of rounds is even, so that the distinguisher applies.
Do such invariant subspaces attacks also exist for Simpira v2? In an attempt
to find such attacks, we first look for invariant subspaces when all F -functions
are identical. This should give a good starting point to find invariant subspaces
when the real (non-identical) F -functions of Simpira are used. More specifically,
we select a random F -function, and consider four values for every input subblock:
0, F (0), F (F (0)) and F (F (0))⊕F (0). We then apply the Feistel round function
several times, and use Gaussian elimination to check whether we stay within a
particular linear subspace.
Using this technique, we found invariant subspaces for the GFS used in Sim-
pira v2 when b ∈ {4, 6, 8} (i.e. assuming identical F -functions), but not for other
values of b. In fact, it can be seen that there is an invariant subspace for any
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Type-2 GFS with an “even-odd shuffle [75],” that is, where even-numbered input
subblocks are mapped to odd-numbered output subblocks and vice versa. For
b = 4, such an invariant subspace is shown in Fig. 14. With the introduction
of appropriate round constants, however, these invariant subspace attacks are
avoided.
F F
A B A B
F F
D C D C
C A C A
Fig. 14. The Type-2 GFS with b = 4, used in Simpira v2. We assume that all F -
functions are identical. Here, A and B can be any value. If the odd-numbered input
subblocks are equal, and the even-numbered input subblocks are equal, then this prop-
erty is preserved for any number of rounds.
We chose to retain Type-2 GFS in Simpira v2 for b ∈ {4, 6, 8}, instead of re-
placing them by Generalized Feistel structures that “inherently” avoid invariant
subspace attacks. This is because Type-2 GFS constructions are efficient and
well-analyzed, and invariant subspaces can be avoided by using round constants.
We searched for invariant subspaces in all Simpira v2 variants, but were un-
able to find any. A similar search was also performed by Rønjom [72], who also
could not identify invariant subspaces in the updated Simpira design. Unfortu-
nately, currently no provable arguments against invariant subspace attacks are
known. This is an interesting topic for future work.
10 Conclusion
We introduced Simpira, which is a family of cryptographic permutations that
processes inputs of 128× b bits. It is intended to be a very conservative design
that achieves high throughput on processors with AES instructions. We decided
to use two rounds of AES as a building block, with the goal of simplifying
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the design space exploration, and making the cryptanalysis and implementation
straightforward.
With this building block, we explored a large number of generalized Feistel
structures, and calculated how many rounds are required to reach either full bit
diffusion, or 25 linearly or differentially active S-boxes, whichever is greater. To
ensure a large security margin, we multiplied this number of rounds by three.
Of all designs that we considered, we selected the ones with the lowest amount
of F -functions in total.
Following these design criteria, Simpira resulted in seven different designs.
For b = 1, we have AES with fixed round keys. Simpira uses a Feistel structure
for b = 2, a Type-1 GFS for b = 3, and a Type-2 GFS for b = 4. The b ≥ 5
design is a dedicated construction that we introduce in this paper. For b = 6 and
b = 8, we use Suzaki and Minematsu’s improved Type-2 GFS, as it has fewer
F -functions than general construction for b ≥ 5.
Our benchmarks on Intel Skylake showed that Simpira is close to the theo-
retical optimum of only executing AESENC instructions. For b ≤ 4, Simpira is less
than 3% away from this optimum. For b ≤ 32, corresponding to inputs of up to
512 bytes, Simpira is less than 13% away from this optimum for a non-interleaved
implementation, and less than 1% away for an interleaved implementation.
It is unfortunate that many methods to encrypt wide input blocks, such as
VIL, CMC, and EME, have not seen widespread adoption. The main obstacle
appears to be that they are patented. We hope that Simpira can provide an
interesting alternative: it is not only free from patent concerns, but offers security
way beyond the 264 limit for typical AES-based modes.
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64. Mendel, F., Rechberger, C., Schläffer, M., Thomsen, S.S.: The Rebound Attack:
Cryptanalysis of Reduced Whirlpool and Grøstl. In: FSE 2009. LNCS, vol. 5665,
pp. 260–276. Springer (2009)
65. Moriai, S., Vaudenay, S.: On the Pseudorandomness of Top-Level Schemes of Block
Ciphers. In: ASIACRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1976, pp. 289–302. Springer (2000)
66. Mouha, N.: The Design Space of Lightweight Cryptography. Cryptology ePrint
Archive, Report 2015/303 (2015)
67. Mouha, N., Luykx, A.: Multi-key Security: The Even-Mansour Construction Re-
visited. In: CRYPTO 2015. LNCS, vol. 9215, pp. 209–223. Springer (2015)
68. Mouha, N., Mennink, B., Herrewege, A.V., Watanabe, D., Preneel, B., Ver-
bauwhede, I.: Chaskey: An Efficient MAC Algorithm for 32-bit Microcontrollers.
In: SAC 2014. LNCS, vol. 8781, pp. 306–323. Springer (2014)
69. Mouha, N., Wang, Q., Gu, D., Preneel, B.: Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis
Using Mixed-Integer Linear Programming. In: Inscrypt 2011. LNCS, vol. 7537, pp.
57–76. Springer (2011)
70. Rechberger, C.: On Bruteforce-Like Cryptanalysis: New Meet-in-the-Middle At-
tacks in Symmetric Cryptanalysis. In: ICISC 2012. LNCS, vol. 7839, pp. 33–36.
Springer (2013)
71. Rogaway, P., Steinberger, J.P.: Security/Efficiency Tradeoffs for Permutation-
Based Hashing. In: EUROCRYPT 2008. LNCS, vol. 4965, pp. 220–236. Springer
(2008)
72. Rønjom, S.: Personal Communication (March 2016)
73. Rønjom, S.: Invariant subspaces in Simpira. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2016/248 (2016)
74. Schroeppel, R.: The Hasty Pudding Cipher – A Tasty Morsel (1998), submission
to the NIST AES competition
75. Suzaki, T., Minematsu, K.: Improving the Generalized Feistel. In: FSE 2010. LNCS,
vol. 6147, pp. 19–39. Springer (2010)
76. Todo, Y.: Structural Evaluation by Generalized Integral Property. In: EURO-
CRYPT 2015. LNCS, vol. 9056. Springer (2015)
77. Wagner, D.: The Boomerang Attack. In: FSE 1999. LNCS, vol. 1636, pp. 156–170.
Springer (1999)
78. Yanagihara, S., Iwata, T.: On Permutation Layer of Type 1, Source-Heavy, and
Target-Heavy Generalized Feistel Structures. In: CANS 2011. LNCS, vol. 7092, pp.
98–117. Springer (2011)
79. Yanagihara, S., Iwata, T.: Improving the Permutation Layer of Type 1, Type 3,
Source-Heavy, and Target-Heavy Generalized Feistel Structures. IEICE Transac-
tions 96-A(1), 2–14 (2013)
80. Yanagihara, S., Iwata, T.: Type 1.x Generalized Feistel Structures. IEICE Trans-
actions 97-A(4), 952–963 (2014)
81. Zhang, H., Wu, W.: Structural Evaluation for Generalized Feistel Structures and
Applications to LBlock and TWINE. In: INDOCRYPT 2015. LNCS, vol. 9462, pp.
218–237. Springer (2015)
82. Zheng, Y., Matsumoto, T., Imai, H.: On the Construction of Block Ciphers Prov-
ably Secure and Not Relying on Any Unproved Hypotheses. In: CRYPTO 1989.
LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 461–480. Springer (1990)
30
A Simpira for b /∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8}: Full Bit Diffusion and
Active S-Boxes
For the Simpira construction with b /∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8}, it is very straightforward
to show that 4b−6 F -functions are sufficient to reach full bit diffusion, as well as
to ensure that at least 30 S-boxes are active. This can be proven by induction.
Full Bit Diffusion. Recall that full bit diffusion means that every output bit
depends on every input bit, and every input bit depends on every output bit.
Observe that the construction of Fig. 3 reaches full bit diffusion for b = 4. From
the same figure, it can also easily be seen that the four additional F -functions
ensure that full bit diffusion is reached for b+ 1, provided that full bit diffusion
was already reached for b.
Active S-boxes. The MILP tool shows us that the construction of Fig. 3
reaches at least 30 (linearly or differentially) active S-boxes for b = 4. We now
prove that if the construction for b has at least 30 active S-boxes, then it has at
least 30 active S-boxes for b+1. When a non-zero difference or a non-zero linear
mask enters into the construction for b, the result follows directly. If this is not
the case, this imposes a restriction on inputs and outputs for the construction
of b: the difference (or linear mask) of every input and output subblock must
be zero. In that case, the MILP tool proved that the four new F -functions that
were added when going from b to b+1 ensure that there will be at least 30 active
S-boxes. One such case is illustrated in Fig. 15.
B Efficient Implementation For b = 1
We recall the four Intel instructions to implement one round of AES: AESENC
(Alg. 13), AESENCLAST (Alg. 14), AESDEC (Alg. 15), and AESENCLAST (Alg. 16).
The AESIMC instruction corresponds to the InvMixColumns operation. Then for
b = 1, Simpira can be implemented as in Alg. 17, and Simpira−1 as in Alg. 18.
C Optimizing the Number of F -functions
In Sect. 3, we based ourselves mainly on designs that were published in literature,
instead of exhaustively searching for the optimal design that satisfies the design
criteria. Here, we revisit this assumption. In particular, we will consider the case
where b = 4.
An exhaustive search for all GFS with b = 4 shows that full bit diffusion
requires at least 8 F -functions. One such construction is shown in Fig. 17. How-
ever, we found that all designs with 8 F -functions have a lower bound of at most
10 for the number of active S-boxes, and therefore do not satisfy our design
criteria.
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Fig. 15. A differential characteristic for (reduced-round) Simpira with b = 5 that has
30 active S-boxes. A thick full line indicates a difference in every byte, a thick dotted
line refers to a difference in only one byte – it does not matter which one. A normal line
indicates that no difference is present. When non-zero, the number of active S-boxes is
shown above every F -function.
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Algorithm 13 AESENC (= Alg. 1)
1: procedure AESENC(state, key)
2: state ← SubBytes(state)
3: state ← ShiftRows(state)
4: state ← MixColumns(state)
5: state ← state ⊕ key
6: return state
7: end procedure
Algorithm 14 AESENCLAST
1: procedure AESENCLAST(state, key)
2: state ← SubBytes(state)
3: state ← ShiftRows(state)
4:
5: state ← state ⊕ key
6: return state
7: end procedure
Algorithm 15 AESDEC
1: procedure AESDEC(state, key)
2: state ← InvSubBytes(state)
3: state ← InvShiftRows(state)
4: state ← InvMixColumns(state)
5: state ← state ⊕ key
6: return state
7: end procedure
Algorithm 16 AESDECLAST
1: procedure AESDECLAST(state, key)
2: state ← InvSubBytes(state)
3: state ← InvShiftRows(state)
4:
5: state ← state ⊕ key
6: return state
7: end procedure
Algorithm 17 Simpira (b = 1)
(= Alg. 3)
1: procedure Simpira(x0)
2: R ← 6
3: for r = 1, . . . , R − 1 do
4: C ← SETR EPI32(0x00⊕r⊕R,
5: 0x10⊕r⊕R,
6: 0x20⊕r⊕R,
7: 0x30⊕r⊕R)
8:
9: x0 ← AESENC(x,C)
10: x0 ← AESENC(x, 0)
11: c ← c+ 1
12: end for
13: C ← SETR EPI32(0x00⊕R ⊕R,
14: 0x10⊕R ⊕R,
15: 0x20⊕R ⊕R,
16: 0x30⊕R ⊕R)
17:
18: x0 ← AESENC(x,C)
19: x0 ← AESENCLAST(x, 0)
20: return x0
21: end procedure
Algorithm 18 Simpira−1 (b = 1)
(= Alg. 4)
1: procedure Simpira(x0)
2: R ← 6
3: for r = R, . . . , 1 do
4: C ← SETR EPI32(0x00⊕r⊕R,
5: 0x10⊕r⊕R,
6: 0x20⊕r⊕R,
7: 0x30⊕r⊕R)
8: C ← AESIMC(C)
9: x0 ← AESDEC(x,C)
10: x0 ← AESDEC(x, 0)
11: c ← c+ 1
12: end for
13: C ← SETR EPI32(0x00⊕ 1⊕R,
14: 0x10⊕ 1⊕R,
15: 0x20⊕ 1⊕R,
16: 0x30⊕ 1⊕R)
17: C ← AESIMC(C)
18: x0 ← AESDEC(x,C)
19: x0 ← AESDECLAST(x, 0)
20: return x0
21: end procedure
Fig. 16. In Alg. 13–18, we recall the AES-NI instructions of [44] and show how they
can be used to efficiently implement Simpira and its inverse for b = 1.
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To reach both full bit diffusion and at least 25 active S-boxes, at least 9
F -functions are required. An example of such a construction is shown in Fig. 18.
This construction has 35 active S-boxes, and would therefore lead to a slightly
better construction that could replace the current choice for Simpira with b = 4.
However, the problem with this approach is all of these Feistels have a very
random-looking structure. When there is no simple structure, the design becomes
more difficult to cryptanalyze, and possibly also more difficult implement.
It therefore seems better to consider only GFS with either identical round
functions (b ∈ {2, 3, 4, 6, 8} of Simpira), or with the TwoF function that is used
in Simpira for large b. With this restriction, the Simpira design for b = 4 with
10 F -functions is an optimal according to the design criteria.
F
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Fig. 17. A GFS with b = 4 that uses 8
F-functions to reach full bit diffusion.
This design has at least 10 active S-
boxes.
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Fig. 18. A GFS with b = 4 that uses 9
F-functions to reach full bit diffusion.
This design has at least 35 active S-
boxes.
D Comparison with Other Constructions
For comparison, we now provide the throughput of SHA-256, SHA-512, and
Rijndael256 (with a 256-bit block size), measured on the same platform, and
using the same methodology. In the case of SHA-256 and SHA-512, we wrote
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an optimized throughput-oriented implementation that uses the AVX2 archi-
tecture, available on the discussed platform. For SHA-256 and SHA-512, this
implementation processes 4 and 8 independent (long) buffers respectively. For
Rijndael256, we prepared optimized code that uses AES-NI (see details in [44]).
We measured it in ECB mode, operating on 8 blocks in parallel, to get the
highest throughput possible on this platform.
Under this setup, the throughput of SHA-256, SHA-512, and Rijndael256 is
2.35, 3.13, and 1.54 cycles per byte, respectively. Therefore, for b = 2, it is clearly
much faster to use the Simpira permutation, which requires only 0.94 cycles
per byte. This permutation is to be used inside an Even-Mansour construction
(for encryption), or with a Davies-Meyer feedforward (for hashing); but these
operations not change the throughput in a noticeable way.
For larger b, it is interesting to compare Simpira with two-pass constructions,
for example for encryption. We cannot use AES as a building block in a typical
two-pass construction, as it would be insecure beyond about 264 input blocks,
and we aim for security up to 2128 blocks. We may choose Simpira with b = 2
as a building block, as typical alternatives such as Rijndael256 are slower on our
target platform.
In a double-pass mode of operation, Simpira with b = 2 requires at least
2 · 30 · b AESENC operations per 32b bytes, which is 30b AESENC operations
per 16b bytes. When b is large, Simpira requires 24b− 36 AESENC operations
per 16b bytes, which is less than the previously mentioned double-pass mode of
operation, even for very large b.
On a sidenote: Simpira with large b is faster than the two-pass construc-
tion, but cannot process the input blocks in parallel: to fill the pipeline, a suffi-
cient number of independent messages is required. Therefore, which of these two
Simpira-based constructions is better, depends on the application.
35
